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Political integration has contributed to rising inequality in the
Eurozone
What effect has European integration had on inequality? Tobias Tober writes that while from a
theoretical standpoint both economic and political integration can be linked to inequality, there is a
lack of conclusive evidence on the actual effect in practice. Based on a study of 14 EU member
states from 1999 until 2010, he illustrates that although economic integration appears to have no
statistically significant impact on levels of inequality, political integration is consistently associated
with a more unequal distribution of income.
For quite some time now, social scientists have been concerned with the possibility that European
integration might cause rising levels of income inequality in member states. This concern is based on a wide range of
arguments, which – despite their diversity – can be classified into two groups: inequality-enhancing effects of
economic integration on the one hand, and the effects of political integration on the other hand.
The link between economic integration and inequality
The theoretical arguments linking economic integration – that is the openness of national economies for intra-regional
trade – to inequality build on the assumption that economic integration within the European Union adheres to similar
laws as on the global scale. Thus, the mechanisms behind the distributional implications of globalisation should be
relevant in the regional context too. The literature identifies three ways in which European economic integration might
affect inequality.
The Common Market has created a huge labour pool
and has opened up new opportunities for investment in
other European countries. The quantity of production
factors available to firms has therefore been greatly
expanded. This, in turn, puts wage pressure on
domestic workers because these workers can be more
easily substituted by foreign labour and non-labour
factors of production.
Secondly, economic integration has decreased the
bargaining power of unions and so weakened their
ability to protect workers from possible adverse effects
of a system of free markets. This is not only a
consequence of growing wage pressure, but also
follows from the fact that capital is more mobile than
labour within an internal market, whereas unions are
mainly organised nationally.
Thirdly, the loss of control over national boundaries
has made it increasingly difficult for governments to tax mobile factors of production. Thus, national governments feel
forced to engage in regulatory competition with each other in an attempt to attract these mobile factors by low taxes.
Since fiscal capacity determines what policymakers can do, a lower tax yield is associated with less redistribution.
Political integration and inequality
The underlying logic of the effect of political integration – that is the allocation of political competences to institutions
of the European Union – on inequality is much more specific to the European context. Here welfare state research
has argued that the process of European political integration is biased in favour of economic interests and neglects
the social policy dimension, essentially undermining the viability of national welfare states. Particularly the impact of
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), often described as the biggest step in European integration, has been
discussed in this vein (for instance here).
The argument rests on the so-called euro convergence criteria. With the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992, the
member states obliged themselves to meet these criteria before entering the EMU. The convergence criteria require
compliance with specific inflation targets, annual government budget deficit and debt-to-GDP limits, exchange rate
rules, and interest rate levels. To ensure compliance not only at the time of adopting the euro but also in the following
years, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) entered into force in 1998. Since then, various efforts have been made to
tighten the regulations of the SGP and introduce greater macroeconomic surveillance.
Despite these attempts to impose tighter fiscal rules on EMU members, critics have questioned both their
effectiveness as well as their successful implementation from the beginning, and the ubiquitous trends of high deficit
spending and accumulating debt in euro countries seem to confirm this point of view. A first statistical analysis of this
matter, however, suggests that overall government debt would be even higher if the SGP had not been introduced.
This finding supports the claim of those commentators who argue that membership of the EMU induces fiscal
pressure on euro countries by obliging them to adhere to stricter budgetary rules.
Due to these budget constraints, in turn, governments are forced to curtail public expenditure, in particular social
spending. Even though the degree to which welfare states contribute to the mitigation of inequality depends on their
respective institutional design, there is sound evidence that post-tax and post-transfer levels of inequality are on
average lower in more generous welfare states. Thus, the spending depressing effect of political integration should
lead to higher levels of inequality.
Testing the theory
In a recent study (co-authored with Marius R Busemeyer) I have applied statistical regression techniques that take
advantage of yearly variation for the time period 1999-2010 in 14 European union member states. This analysis
shows that, while economic integration exhibits no systematic relationship with inequality as measured by the Gini
coefficient, political integration is consistently associated with a more unequal distribution of income. The result is
robust to the inclusion of a large number of control variables and to different statistical specifications.
Furthermore, the analysis corroborates that the causal mechanism linking political integration to inequality runs
through national fiscal policies, as higher levels of political integration are systematically related to lower levels of
public spending in general and social spending in particular. In the analysis, the two dimensions of European
integration are captured by a recently available index by König and Ohr, which provides information about national
extents of both forms of integration.
These findings allow for three conclusions. First, the result that economic integration is not associated with inequality
is in accordance with the inconclusive evidence concerning the distributional consequences of globalisation in
existing research. Second, the positive effect of political integration on inequality underlines that European economic
integration and European political integration are two related but distinguishable empirical phenomena.
Third, the current institutional and political setup of the European Union certainly does not seem to be an effective
counterweight against the ubiquitous trends toward rising inequality. On the contrary, political integration in its current
form contributes to this trend by threatening the financial viability of national welfare states.
More research is needed to substantiate these conclusions, especially since both the sample of countries as well as
the observed time period are fairly limited. Furthermore, another interesting avenue for future research is to examine
the individual-level implications of European integration. For instance, although economic integration seems not to
have an effect on inequality, it still might affect individual citizens and their policy preferences.
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Note: For a longer discussion of this topic, see the author’s recent paper in European Union Politics. This article
gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London
School of Economics.
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